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Introduction 
The United States has experienced an oil and gas renaissance 
thanks to technological innovations that have propelled unconventional 
resources to the forefront of energy policy discussions. Hydraulic 
fracturing is part of the suite of technologies that have transformed the 
energy industry and outlook over the past fifteen years. Commonly 
called “fracking,”1 the process has been a lightning rod for public and 
environmental concerns about the expansion of oil and gas develop-
ment. This Article introduces the economic factors behind hydraulic 
fracturing. These effects cut across three different scales. First is the 
minute scale at which microfractures in unconventional reservoirs 
allow large productivity increases in well investments. The second is 
an aggregate scale where the market supply of hydrocarbons has 
 
† Assistant Professor, Department of Agricultural Economics and Economics, 
Montana State University. 
1. The phonetically appealing use of a “k” in the term has been widely 
adopted, though a more technical audience eschews the “k” and refers to 
the process as “fracing.” There are regional differences as well, with 
eastern regions more likely to employ the term “hydrofracturing” and 
variants thereof. In general, these are linguistic differences that do not 
pertain to technical differences between techniques, which are discussed 
further below. In full recognition of the signal that it entails, I adopt the 
more common phonetic form.  
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changed due to application of the new technology, with implications 
for global environmental issues. The third and final scale is a human 
scale, as tradeoffs between additional wells and environmental 
impacts are considered.  
Oil and natural gas are formed in geologic time as organic matter 
is transformed by heat and pressure. Geologic strata where these 
transformations take place are referred to as “source rocks.” Over 
time, oil and gas may migrate out of the source rock and into other 
formations where they are trapped. Those formations are conventional 
reservoirs. Many times oil and gas are found together, although 
deposits of only oil or gas occur as well. Exploratory efforts have 
discovered new conventional reservoirs over time, but production 
depletes the known reserves. In the course of seeking productive 
conventional reservoirs, many source rock formations have been 
located. These rock formations include shales, relatively impermeable 
sandstones, and coal beds. Depletion, higher prices, and technological 
advances in exploration and production have made the unconven-
tional resources in source rocks more attractive. Hydraulic fracturing 
is an essential element of the suite of technological advances that has 
incorporated unconventional resources into U.S. energy supply.2 
Hydraulic fracturing has been hailed as a new technology, but the 
process used today is a distillation of advances made over several 
decades. Complementary technologies have contributed to the reserve 
additions and market effects often attributed solely to fracking. Hy-
draulic fracturing has been used for almost seventy years,3 though 
considerable research effort into the mechanics of fractures and the 
technicalities of how to improve production from fractured reservoirs 
has been made in the intervening years. The recent propagation of 
fracking is widely traced to 1998, when a long period of technical 
experimentation came to fruition in the Barnett Shale in Texas.4 Simi-
lar experimentation has occurred in other areas and formations as well.5  
 
2. See Howard Rogers, Shale Gas—The Unfolding Story, 27 Oxford Rev. 
Econ. Pol’y 117, 123–25 (2011) (explaining that recent advancements 
in hydraulic fracturing have resulted in dramatic growth in uncon-
ventional gas production). 
3. During the 1940s, Pan American Petroleum Corporation experimented 
with increasing well productivity through fracturing. Halliburton first 
commercialized the process in early 1949 under an exclusive license from 
Pan American that lasted until 1953. Although no commercial fracking 
jobs were conducted in 1949, jobs were performed at a rate of 4,500 per 
month by 1955. Am. Petroleum Inst., History of Petroleum 
Engineering 600–02 (1961). 
4. Daniel Yergin, The Quest: Energy, Security, and the Remaking 
of the Modern World 327–29 (2011). 
5. See Scott R. Reeves et al., Technology, Efficiencies Keys to Resource 
Expansion, Oil & Gas J., Oct. 1, 2007, at 46, 46–47 (noting the oil and 
 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 63·Issue 4·2013 
Frackonomics: Some Economics of Hydraulic Fracturing 
1339 
But fracking is only part of the innovation. Unconventional 
resources are unlocked by a combination of technologies. The gains 
from directional drilling and advanced seismography add to the gains 
from stimulating reservoirs by fracturing.6 Fracking is often mischar-
acterized as a drilling technology. In fact, the process does not begin 
until after the wellbore is drilled. But many wells would not be drilled 
at all if they could not be fractured—the productivity of a well 
depends on all of the technical attributes. Although the combination 
of horizontal drilling and fracking has been especially valuable in 
shale reservoirs, the two need not be used together. Fracture stimu-
lation is used in reservoirs with vertical wells, such as the Jonah gas 
field in Wyoming, and horizontal wellbores are used without fracturing, 
such as for SAG-D recovery of oil sands in Alberta. 
I. Hydraulic Fracturing 
A nontechnical description of hydraulic fracturing helps explain 
the source of productivity gains.7 The fracking process always begins 
after a wellbore is drilled but usually before the well is completed and 
production begins. The basic idea is to inject a fluid solvent into the 
target formation at sufficient pressure to crack the rocks. Large 
pumps on the surface generate this pressure. The solvent exerts the 
pressure on the formation rocks and carries material (usually sand) 
down into the fractures that are created. When pumped into the 
fissures, the sand props the fractures open and keeps them open. 
Thus, the sand is referred to as the “proppant.” Several different sizes 
of sand are often used.8 Smaller-diameter material is injected first and 
pushed further from the wellbore to hold the smallest part of the 
fracture, with larger-diameter material filling in behind. In reservoirs 
 
gas industry’s strong investment in recovery research and development 
during the late 1980s and early 1990s that yielded returns in later years). 
6. Horizontal drilling is another technology that has been known for many 
years but recently has been increasingly utilized to boost resource 
production. In 1891, John Smalley Campbell obtained the first 
horizontal drilling patent, intended primarily for dental use but 
acknowledging applications for “heavy work.” U.S. Patent No. 459,152 
(filed Nov. 5, 1889) (issued Sept. 8, 1891). Decades later, horizontal 
drilling was used to drill a Texas oil well completed in 1929. U.S. 
Energy Info. Admin., Drilling Sideways—A Review of Horizontal 
Well Technology and Its Domestic Application 7 (1993).  
7. The technically inclined reader will enjoy the detail in Standard 
Handbook of Petroleum and Natural Gas Engineering (William 
C. Lyons & Gary J. Plisga eds., 2d ed. 2005). 
8. Increased demand for specialized sand has increased prices and triggered a 
supply response in the form of sandstone mining. This industry has been 
concentrated in the Upper Midwest, but other regions such as Montana 
have explored the possibility of producing natural proppant locally.  
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with very high pressures, sand is not strong enough to hold the 
fractures open, and more durable synthetic proppants can be used 
instead.9 Once the fracture is propped, hydrocarbons flow out of the 
surrounding rock and into the wellbore. 
Four technical innovations differentiate contemporary fracking 
from its predecessors. First, substantially larger volumes of fluid and 
proppant are injected: sometimes high-volume fracturing involves 
injecting millions of gallons of fluid and thousands of tons of 
proppant.10 Larger volumes then require larger pumps on the surface. 
Second, two different types of fracturing jobs—water fracks and gel 
fracks—have been combined to form “slickwater” fracks. This 
combination employs the advantage of gel, which carries large 
amounts of proppant to enhance permeability, as well as the 
advantage of water, which creates more and cleaner fractures.11 Third, 
multistage jobs are an important improvement over earlier open-hole 
jobs.12 The ability to isolate sections of the wellbore leverages 
additional horsepower and gives more control over the process. 
Fourth, considerable effort has gone into optimizing the chemical 
additives in the injected fluid. Different additives give the fluid 
properties that may help it carry more material down the hole, or 
that may enhance production after the stimulation activity is 
complete. Fracturing “recipes” vary substantially between formations 
 
9. Synthetic proppants are generally much more expensive than natural 
materials, so synthetics are only used in cases where natural proppants 
are inadequate. While sand costs about $0.05–$0.10 per pound, synthetic 
proppants typically cost $0.40–$0.50 per pound. 
10. Ann Davis Vaughan & David Pursell, Frac Attack: Risks, 
Hype, and Financial Reality of Hydraulic Fracturing in the 
Shale Plays 12–13 (2010). A recent well in Louisiana’s Haynesville 
Shale might require four million gallons of water and four million 
pounds of proppant, while the nearby Cotton Valley formation was 
fractured during the mid-1980s using half as much water and much less 
proppant. Id. at 13. The Cotton Valley formation has recently been 
reentered, using more modern techniques, with good results. The Cotton 
Valley wells are still considerably cheaper than the nearby Haynesville wells 
in part because vertical wells are cheaper to drill than horizontal wells. 
11. See, e.g., Dennis Degner, Range Resources, Hydraulic Fracturing 
Fluid Considerations in Marcellus Shale Completions 3–5 (2011) 
(discussing the benefits of “slickwater” hydraulic fracturing). 
12. An excellent description of the evolution of fracking practices in the 
Bakken Shale is available at Completion Technologies, Energy & 
Envtl. Res. Ctr., http://www.undeerc.org/bakken/completiontechnol 
ogies.aspx (last visited Mar. 8, 2013). While open-hole completions are 
“relatively quick and inexpensive,” they “provide[ ] little control over 
fracture initiation and propagation.” Id. More recent trends favor 
multistage jobs “because of [their] high degree of fracture control and 
long-term success rate.” Id. 
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and different firms.13 The characteristics of the reservoir dictate the 
type of fracturing that is required.  
The reality of fracturing is not as simple as it sounds, in large 
part because the action occurs far underground where monitoring is 
difficult. Even with the aid of microseismic monitoring, engineers 
rarely know the exact geometry of fractures.14 Fractures do not 
necessarily propagate regularly in the deep subsurface where a 
complex lattice of preexisting faults and fissures can enhance or 
inhibit the conductivity of artificial fractures. Adding the dimension 
of time, the fracture morphology becomes even more tortuous; 
fractures can change over time. The exact topography of the factures 
complicates the fluid dynamics within the reservoir, which affects the 
transmissivity of the reservoir. This uncertainty means that engineers 
constantly learn by experimentation. By studying well logs and 
production reports, geologists and engineers can devise new strategies 
to improve well performance, weighing the costs of enhanced 
treatments against the expected benefits of increased production.  
The fracturing fluid is recovered over the course of time. Because 
the toxicity of the fluid is a primary environmental concern, the 
degree and timing of recovery is a salient issue. Results vary by 
formation. Some rocks absorb more of the fluid than others. In some 
formations, a majority of the fluid flows back during the fracking 
process, while in others the balance of the water is recovered with the 
produced hydrocarbons over the course of subsequent weeks and 
months. In some cases fluid can be treated and reused, while in others 
disposal is preferred.15 
Geologic conditions vary from region to region and even between 
formations within a region. These variations require a period of 
“learning by doing” as engineers experiment with the technical 
elements to crack the code of a particular formation and maximize 
production. For this reason, operators undertake multiwell projects, or 
drilling campaigns, to give engineers and geologists a chance to figure 
 
13. Service providers actively compete in providing additives. The exact 
combination of additives is fiercely protected as a trade secret by many 
servicing companies. These same companies typically bundle materials 
with consulting services to best apply inputs to a particular well.  
14. See generally Mike Vincent, Examining Our Assumptions—Have 
Oversimplifications Jeopardized Our Ability to Design Optimal Fracture 
Treatments?, Soc’y Petrol. Engineers (2010), http://www.spe.org 
/dl/docs/2010/MikeVincent.pdf (describing the many complexities ob-
scuring accurate assessment of fracturing techniques). 
15. The cost of fresh water appears to be a major determinant of this 
decision at this time, but perceived environmental or regulatory costs 
could change the calculus for operators. See Christopher S. Kulander, 
Shale Oil and Gas State Regulatory Issues and Trends, 63 Case W. 
Res. L. Rev. 1101, 1105–07 (2013) (discussing the application of state 
water law to shale oil and gas well completion). 
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out how to optimize production.16 Many considerations affect well 
design decisions, and fracturing consultants are often retained. 
A. Microfracture-onomics 
Stimulating a reservoir by hydraulic fracturing increases the 
initial flow to the wellbore and the production of the well. A key to 
this process is the exposure of the wellbore to a large area of the 
reservoir. Consider for a moment the access that a perforated 
horizontal wellbore provides to the surface of the source rock. 
Comparing the formation surface area connected to the wellbore by 
perforations or fractures, the downhole surface area exposed to the 
resevoir can be increased by as much as several thousand times.17 
Increasing the surface area allows production from less permeable 
(“tighter”) formations, which makes production from shales and other 
unconventional resources possible. Although more permeability is 
required for oil than gas, the advantage of well-designed and 
implemented fracture designs is tremendous—three to five orders of 
magnitude is not out of the question. The initial production of the 
well is a function of the initial pressure and exposed area: holding the 
reservoir pressure constant, fracturing the well can increase initial 
production rates by a factor similar to the increase in exposed area.  
Consider the alternative to fracturing wells. Instead of increasing 
reservoir contact by fracking, operators could simply drill more wells. 
To match the contact provided by one fractured well, an operator 
would have to drill hundreds or thousands more wellbores. The return 
of these investments would be a fraction of the return rate with 
fracking. If the operator is trying to buy reservoir contact, drilling 
new well bores is dramatically more expensive than fracking. 
Hydraulic fracturing has different effects in vertical and horizontal 
wells.18 The engineering subtlety of a detail such as proper proppant 
sizing indicates the difficulty of economic analysis. Correctly sized 
proppant costs about the same as the wrong size, in most cases, but 
 
16. Rogers, supra note 2, at 129 fig.8. 
17. The engineering term for this is “reservoir contact.” The author is 
indebted to John Getty of the Petroleum Engineering Lab at Montana 
Tech for this illustrative example. The hypothetical example is based on 
a typical, recent Bakken well with an 8000-foot lateral string. The 
contemplated fracture design is a thirty-stage program. The exact ratio 
is a function of fracture length and pressure applied. A ratio of 3200:1 is 
conservative given recent fracture designs. Successful multiple transverse 
fracture designs may achieve as much as two orders of magnitude more 
reservoir contact. 
18. See Janie M. Chermak et al., Impacts of Hydraulic Fracturing and 
Completion Decisions on Shale Gas Well Productivity 30–31 (Oct. 16, 
2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=2162486 (finding differences in how certain variables affect 
horizontal and vertical wells differently). 
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makes a large difference in well productivity.19 Differences within 
formations over time can be just as stark. The Bakken provides a 
good example as open-hole horizontal completions have given way to 
multistage jobs, with the number of stages now decreasing in an effort 
to balance returns and cost. 
Initial flow rate is particularly important to the operator for two 
reasons. The first is that a high initial flow rate provides a large 
revenue stream. Developing oil and gas wells is capital-intensive, and 
the proceeds from a good well are a welcome fillip for cash flow. 
Operators, especially smaller independents that drill a majority of 
wells,20 are heavily dependent on cash flow financing, which compounds 
the importance of initial production rates. This concern is especially 
true for drilling campaigns. One interesting difference between 
conventional and unconventional reservoirs is the higher variance in 
initial production rates for unconventional wells.21 This variance is due 
in part to the imprecise knowledge of unconventional reservoirs and the 
optimal application of fracking procedures. Thus, plenty of room 
remains for improvement in the understanding of how to most 
efficiently extract oil and gas from unconventional reservoirs. But it 
creates a financing risk for developers uncertain about future revenues. 
Ultimate recovery is the final measure of the value of a well. The 
geophysics of extraction cause production to decline over time, so the 
ultimate recovery is a function of initial flow. The initial production 
level affects the total recovery. To the extent that reservoir 
stimulation increases initial flow, it also increases total recovery. But 
uncertain initial flow also implies that the ultimate recovery varies 
across wells, even within the same formation and lease. Once a well 
comes in, or begins producing, an operator can hedge some or all of 
the production risk in derivatives markets. This practice effectively 
trades future gas for current cash.  
Well flow rates decline over time. The behavior of unconventional 
wells differs slightly from that of conventional wells. Fractured wells 
typically decline hyperbolically as opposed to exponentially.22 This 
 
19. Id.  
20. IHS Global Insight, The Economic Contribution of the 
Onshore Independent Oil and Natural Gas Producers to the 
U.S. Economy 41 (2011) [hereinafter IHS]. In 2009, independent oil and 
natural gas producers drilled 26,030 wells, compared to just 1,379 drilled 
by others. Id. at 41 tbl.19.  
21. Henry D. Jacoby et al., The Influence of Shale Gas on U.S. Energy and 
Environmental Policy, 1 Econ. Energy & Envtl. Pol’y 37, 40–41 
(2012). 
22. Id. at 40; see Standard Handbook of Petroleum and Natural 
Gas Engineering, supra note 7, § 7.1.4.1 (explaining the difference 
between an exponential decline curve and a hyperbolic decline curve); 
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means that the initial decline rate is high relative to a conventional 
well, but that production levels off and continues instead of 
continuing to diminish. This pattern makes the early production all 
the more important. 
A significant but still unproven feature of unconventional wells is 
the ability to restimulate the reservoir over the course of time. 
Hydraulic fracturing was initially developed as a reservoir stimulation 
treatment. The ability to refracture a reservoir and increase 
production for some period of time after initial production potentially 
gives rise to a very different pattern of development. Some success has 
been observed with reentry and restimulating wells in unconventional 
formations like the Barnett Shale in Texas and in the Wattenberg 
field in Colorado.23 But the future of “factory” models of production, 
in which one well is restimulated every few years, with little reduction 
in the initial flow rate across the treatments, is still speculative. 
Combined with pad drilling, which takes advantage of directional 
drilling capability to group several wells together on the surface, 
fracking could potentially shift the nature of oil and gas development 
from a large number of one-off wells to clusters of continually 
productive assets.  
B. Macrofrackonomics 
Technical innovation in the application of hydraulic fracturing 
and related technologies has transformed the outlook for domestic oil 
and gas production in the United States. Oil and gas resources are 
extensive, but the uncertainty about the location, feasibility, and 
profitability of extraction defines the economic decisions regarding 
resource use. As an example, shale deposits are widespread, but the 
value of the resource is not clear from the physical availability. 
Forecasts can vary widely depending on the definition of resources; 
this Article adopts a conservative approach to defining oil and gas 
resources.24 Three measures capture the impact of new technology: 
economic reserves, a measure of the abundance of hydrocarbon 
resources; production, or the flow of resources into the economy; and 
prices, which measure the relative scarcity of oil and gas. Drilling 
investments are a related measure. The cheap abundance of natural 
 
Rogers, supra note 2, at 127 (noting the rate of well production decline 
in the Barnett Shale). 
23. Rogers, supra note 2, at 128; Vello A. Kuuskraa, Fostering Continuing 
Innovation in Unconventional Oil and Gas, U.S. Ass’n for Energy 
Econ. (Oct. 11, 2011), http://www.usaee.org/usaee2011/submissions/pr 
esentations/kuuskraa.pdf. 
24. For a discussion about competing estimates of the resource base and 
about how proved reserves is a conservative measure, see Vello A. 
Kuuskraa, Resource Potential Estimates Likely to Change, Oil & Gas 
J., Sept. 17, 2007, at 64. 
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gas has global environmental implications as cleaner-burning gas 
replaces other sources of energy.25 
The net result of combined technological change has been to 
drastically increase the U.S. economic reserves of both oil and natural 
gas. Economic reserves are defined as the physical quantity of 
resource that is known and could be profitably produced given current 
technology and prices. Technological progress is likely to expand the 
physical amount of resources that can be extracted profitably. But the 
impetus for technical innovation in nonrenewable resource markets 
may be reaction to relative scarcity, so it is not clear that technical 
change is exogenous. This Article’s primary concern is not about the 
exact timing of the changes in reserves, production, and prices. A 
casual analysis of the problem is sufficient. 
Economic reserves evolve in at least three known ways. First, if 
additional resources are discovered or if known resources become 
recoverable thanks to technological advances, the reserve base 
increases. Second, the force of depletion works in the opposite 
direction by reducing reserves. Oil and gas are naturally nonrenewable 
resources, and therefore the production of oil and gas reduces the 
total amount left for the future. The net effect of these two forces is a 
question of considerable interest to natural resource economists, and 
the net effect is different for oil and gas.26 The third force at work on 
economic reserves is price. If prices rise for some exogenous reason (for 
example, a politically induced supply shock elsewhere in the world), 
then some resources that were not economically feasible at a lower 
price may become profitable to recover. Conversely, a price fall might 
cause operators to shut in marginal production to save the resource 
for a more favorable price environment.  
1. Reserves 
Natural gas occurs by itself and in association with crude oil or 
other types of hydrocarbons. Different sources of natural gas reserves, 
such as associated or wet gas deposits, are tracked in terms of dry 
natural gas content. Various types of natural gas reserves are then 
aggregated into a total reserve base at any point in time. This 
aggregation is not a problem because the different sources yield the 
same products after processing.  
 
25. See Jacoby et al., supra note 21, 44–50 (acknowledging that shale 
production may help reduce greenhouse gas emissions while cautioning 
that shale production may stunt the development of cleaner 
technologies). 
26. See John T. Cuddington & Diana L. Moss, Technological Change, 
Depletion, and the U.S. Petroleum Industry, 91 Am. Econ. Rev. 1135, 
1143–44 (2001) (finding that technological change in the past few 
decades has reduced the exploration and development costs for natural 
gas more than it has for crude oil). 
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Petroleum differs from natural gas in that crude oil comes in a 
variety of different grades. Prices are often reported for particular 
grades at specified locations, such as West Texas Intermediate at 
Cushing, Oklahoma. Price differences are determined by refining cost 
and yield, as well as transportation basis. Calculation of oil reserves 
requires aggregating the physical volume of different crude streams 
without correcting for the different value of alternative streams. The 
refining process makes the same products from different crude 
streams, though in slightly different proportions.  
Other hydrocarbon resources are important to estimating the 
value of hydraulic fracturing. Unconventional resources are often rich 
in natural gas liquids (NGLs), or liquids found with natural gas that 
are not crude oil. This category includes important chemical 
feedstocks such as ethane and butane as well as other consumer 
products like propane and natural gasoline. Previously classified as 
lease condensate, these products can command a price premium and 
are marketed separately. Aggregating NGLs has the same issues as 
crude oil due to natural variation in input composition. À la carte 
pricing of constituent products makes the value of NGLs highly 
dependent on their makeup. Refining byproducts known as natural 
gas plant liquids are a substitute for lease-level NGLs. 
Figure 1 depicts the fluctuation in U.S. proved reserves for oil and 
natural gas. The last ten years of the series show a dramatic increase 
in natural gas reserves. The timing of the increase in natural gas 
reserves coincides with the timing of technical innovations for 
unconventional resources that have since entered the reserve base. 
The increase is not instantaneous because of the necessary time to 
prove the economic viability of various unconventional resources. 
More speculative measures of reserves, such as inferred or probable 
reserves, are sometimes used, but here the more conservative proved 
reserves are reported. 
The magnitude of the increase represents nearly a doubling in the 
reserve base and has pushed domestic natural gas reserves to an all-
time high. The higher market value of natural gas—in the wake of 
regulatory reforms that have de-balkanized the natural gas market27 
—is an important consideration when comparing the absolute 
magnitude of reserves over time. The drastic effect on the natural gas 
reserve base has been referred to as the “natural gas revolution.”28 
The reserve-to-production ratio has risen from a low of 6.9 in 199829 
 
27. See James H. McGrew, FERC: Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission 61–70 (ABA Basic Practice Ser., 2d ed. 2009) (providing a 
brief history of natural gas industry regulation). 
28. See, e.g., Yergin, supra note 4, at 325. 
29. In 1998, U.S. proved natural gas reserves were 164.041 trillion cubic 
feet, and production was 23.924 trillion cubic feet. U.S. Natural Gas 
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to 11.4 in 2010.30 This additional reserve growth beyond production 
growth has led some pundits to describe the U.S. natural gas situation 
as a hundred-year gas supply.31  
Oil reserves have increased less than gas, though a reserve addition 
of approximately 10 percent occurred from 2006 to 2010.32 In part this 
increase is due to the later application of hydraulic fracturing to oil 
reservoirs. Technology developed for gas-rich shale formations has been 
expanded to oil-rich shale formations such as the Bakken in North 
Dakota and Montana as well as the Eagle Ford in Texas. 
Figure 1: Oil and Natural Gas Proved Reserves 1899–2010 33 
 
 
Reserves Summary as of Dec. 31, U.S. Energy Info. Admin., 
http://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/xls/NG_ENR_SUM_DCU_NUS_A.xls 
(last updated Aug. 2, 2012) [hereinafter Natural Gas Reserves]; U.S. 
Energy Info. Admin., Natural Gas Annual 1998 at 4 tbl.1 (1999). 
30.  In 2010, proved natural gas reserves were 304.625 trillion cubic feet, and 
production was 26.816 trillion cubic feet. Natural Gas Reserves, supra 
note 31; U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Natural Gas Annual 2011 at 
1 tbl.1 (2013). 
31. See, e.g., Potential Gas Comm., Potential Supply of Natural 
Gas in the United States (2012). Such predictions use less 
conservative measures than proved reserves, including probable, 
possible, and speculative reserves. 
32. U.S. Crude Oil Proved Reserves, U.S. Energy Info. Admin., http:// 
www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist_xls/RCRR01NUS_1a.xls (last updated 
Aug. 2, 2012). 
33. Id.; see also Natural Gas Reserves, supra note 31 (spreadsheet showing 
proved reserves from 1925 to 2010). 
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2. Production 
Figure 2 shows monthly production of oil and gas in the United 
States. In addition to reserve growth, domestic natural gas production 
has increased in recent years. An important portion of demand growth 
has been for gas-fired electricity generation. This new demand has been 
in response to both technical innovation in the form of new natural gas 
turbines and increasing regulation of coal-fired generation. Production of 
natural gas liquids has been an important component in the rate of 
return from shale gas. Because of the several sources of these products, 
reliable and continuous production data are not available. 
The strong price environment for oil over the past few years has 
provided an incentive for operators to locate new wells and bring 
them into production. This pushed operators into more costly 
environments, including the deepwater Gulf of Mexico. Production 
has responded after a long, steady decline. The response has been 
pronounced in unconventional oil. North Dakota, powered by oil from 
the Bakken Shale, is now the second-highest producing state after 
Texas.34 At the same time, the conventional fields in California and 
Alaska have continued to decline.35 
 
34. Crude Oil Production, U.S. Energy Info. Admin., http://www.eia.gov/ 
dnav/pet/pet_crd_crpdn_adc_mbblpd_a.htm (last updated Mar. 15, 
2013). Texas produced the most barrels of crude oil per day in 2012 
(1,971,000), while North Dakota produced the second most (663,000).  
35. Id.  
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Figure 2: Oil and Natural Gas Production 1980–2013 36 
 
3. Prices 
The growth in reserves and production has had dramatic price 
effects in the natural gas market.37 This is due to the physical nature 
of natural gas. Unlike crude oil or propane, which can move by 
alternative means such as truck or rail, natural gas is limited to 
pipeline transport. Distribution networks are therefore limited. 
International trade in natural gas depends on terrestrial pipeline 
connections to Canada and Mexico and specialized liquefied natural 
gas (LNG) shipment facilities for ocean transport. The United States 
has a very limited capacity for LNG imports, and export capacity is 
 
36. For the oil production data utilized for the creation of Figure 2, see U.S. 
Field Production of Crude Oil, U.S. Energy Info. Admin. (Apr. 29, 
2013), http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist_xls/MCRFPUS1m.xls. For the 
natural gas production data utilized for the creation of Figure 2, see U.S. 
Natural Gas Gross Withdrawals, U.S. Energy Info. Admin., http:// 
www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/hist_xls/N9010US2m.xls (last updated Apr. 30, 
2013). Reporting of such data is required by the Federal Energy 
Administration Act of 1974. See U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Monthly 
Natural Gas Production Report: Form EIA-914, available at 
http://www.eia.gov/survey/form/eia_914/form.pdf; U.S. Energy Info. 
Admin., Monthly Natural Gas Liquids Report: Form EIA-816, 
available at http://www.eia.gov/survey/form/eia_816/form.pdf; U.S. 
Energy Info. Admin., Form EIA-182: Domestic Crude Oil First 
Purchase Report, available at http://www.eia.gov/survey/form/eia 
_182/form.pdf. 
37. Compare supra Figure 2, with infra Figure 3. 
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currently being constructed or converted.38 Increased domestic 
production must therefore be absorbed by the market or fixed storage 
facilities. Flooding the market with natural gas has helped to depress 
natural gas prices from earlier levels. 
In contrast to gas, oil is fungible and is traded on a global market. 
The U.S. imports large quantities of oil both from North American 
neighbors and via ocean-going vessels. The United States is an 
exporter of refined petroleum products. The fungibility of oil is 
imperfect, or more precisely, costly. The expansion of oil production 
in areas of the U.S. without existing infrastructure links (e.g., North 
Dakota) has contributed to a basis differential between the 
continental pricing point at Cushing, Oklahoma, and coastal prices 
such as the Brent price, the more widely-accepted global benchmark 
price of crude oil.39 Because U.S. oil production is a relatively small 
share of global oil production, domestic increases have little effect on 
prices. Oil prices are determined on a global market.  
Figure 3: Oil and Natural Gas Prices 1997–2013 40 
 
 
38. For a review of the U.S. LNG situation, see Kenneth B. Medlock III, 
U.S. LNG Exports: Truth and Consequence 21 (2012), available at 
http://www.bakerinstitute.org/publications/US%20LNG%20Exports%20-
%20Truth%20and%20Consequence%20Final_Aug12-1.pdf. 
39. See Severin Borenstein & Ryan Kellogg, The Incidence of an Oil Glut: 
Who Benefits from Cheap Crude Oil in the Midwest?, 34 Energy J. 
(forthcoming Sept. 2013). 
40. For the oil pricing data utilized for the creation of Figure 3, see Cushing, 
OK WTI Spot Price FOB, U.S. Energy Info. Admin. (May 5, 2013), 
http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist_xls/RWTCd.xls. For the natural gas 
pricing data utilized for the creation of Figure 3, see Henry Hub Gulf 
Coast Natural Gas Spot Price, U.S. Energy Info. Admin. (May 5, 
2013), http://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/hist_xls/RNGWHHDd.xls. 
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When NGL price premia were relatively large and positive, many 
operators flooded into “liquid-rich” plays like the Eagle Ford shale in 
Texas.41 As the price premia have deteriorated due to increased 
supply, operators have chased petroleum and sought innovative means 
to deliver their product to locations with local price premia. 
4. Drilling 
Price expectations have affected decisions by operators about 
where to drill and how much to drill. The number of drilling rigs 
actively working on oil and gas wells fluctuates over time, as Figure 4 
shows. More drilling occurs when prices are high and are expected to 
stay high, whereas rigs are idled when prices are less favorable. Rig 
counts are considered leading indicators of production, though the risk 
that holes will be unprofitable is quite real. The long-term cycles in oil 
and gas drilling are evident from the rig count. Starting in the late 
1990s more and more rigs were deployed in search of natural gas. 
Since 2009, as the value of hydraulic fracturing has been 
demonstrated, such as in the Bakken Shale, many rigs have converted 
to relatively more valuable oil in preference to gas. 
Figure 4: Oil and Natural Gas Rig Counts 1984–2013 42 
 
 
41. Harry R. Weber, Eagle Ford to get Big Play from Marathon, Hous. 
Chron. (Dec. 4, 2012, 6:44 PM), http://www.chron.com/business/energy/ 
article/Eagle-Ford-to-get-big-play-from-Marathon-4091172.php (describing 
Marathon’s plan to expend “more than a third of its $5.2 billion capital 
budget for 2013” on beginning operations into the Eagle Ford Shale). 
42. Smith Bits STATS provides information on rig counts. See Rig Count 
History, Smith STATS, http://stats.smith.com/new/history/statshistory. 
htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2013) (individual spreadsheets by quarter for 
download for each year). 
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A counterfactual to the use of fracking is difficult to consider 
given its widespread adoption throughout the oil and gas industry. In 
the past year or two, debate has shifted from consideration of a ban 
to discussion about an adequate regulatory framework for the process. 
The regulatory debate hinges on the economic contribution on local, 
regional, national, and global scales. One study speculates that with 
severe restrictions on the use of fracking, gas production would fall by 
17 percent despite a higher price environment, with the majority of 
the reduction coming from unconventional resources.43 
C. Costs 
The physical gains from hydraulic fracturing are impressive, but 
the costs of the process have to be considered in a full accounting. 
Focusing on onshore wells, a back-of-the-envelope calculation 
attributes 25 percent of drilling costs to the fracturing and 
completion. Over the period from 2006 to 2010, the average number 
of wells drilled per year was 43,237, with an average cost of $2.38 
million per well.44 Twenty-five percent of that is $595,000, with a 
range from $345,000 to $863,000. This calculation assumes that every 
single well drilled is fractured, so it represents a lower bound on 
servicing costs. More expensive wells, such as deep horizontal wells, 
often have more expensive fracturing jobs. A typical Bakken well 
costs $8–10 million with about $1.5–2.5 million in fracking cost. The 
increased production from such wells needs to offset the higher 
drilling costs. The panoply of completion options available to 
operators increases the variance in costs. 
Figure 5 depicts the average cost of new wells of all types at all 
locations in the United States. The costs are normalized to 2000 
dollars so that all years are comparable. The increase in drilling costs 
is marked, particularly since the late 1990s.45 An alternative 
explanation of these data immediately presents itself—drilling costs 
could be increasing because wells are getting deeper. If we are seeking 
a nonrenewable resource like oil, it seems practical to drill the 
relatively cheaper shallow deposits first.46 The real cost per foot drilled 
 
43. Vaughan & Pursell, supra note 10, at 7. 
44. The total number of wells was 51,787 in 2006, 52,169 in 2007, 55,096 in 
2008, 32,462 in 2009, and 27,409 in 2010, but the 2010 total may increase 
due to a lag in reporting. IHS, supra note 20, at 41. The total cost of 
wells drilled was $98.6 billion in 2006, $124 billion in 2007, $164 billion 
in 2008, $108 billion in 2009, and $106 billion in 2010. Id. at 43.  
45. See infra Figure 5. 
46. Economists usually refer to this as the Herfindahl Principle, though it 
has been demonstrated not to hold theoretically and empirically. For 
helpful background material on the Herfindahl Principle, see generally 
Eric Iksoon Im et al., Discontinuous Extraction of a Nonrenewable 
Resource, 90 Econ. Letters 6 (2006).  
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is an alternative measure. That series shows a similar trend to the 
total well cost (though at a slightly slower rate because wells are also 
becoming deeper).47  
Figure 5: Cost per Well Drilled 1960–2007 48 
 
Two major methodological changes are driving the increase. In 
order to use more advanced drilling techniques such as directional and 
horizontal drilling, larger and more sophisticated rigs must be used. 
Such rigs have higher rates (on a day or footage basis). Second, 
stimulating the reservoir prior to first production, or fracking the well, 
adds to the drilling costs. Because almost all wells are fractured, part 
of the increase in drilling costs is attributable to fracking. An example 
of both factors (more extensive rig and more fracking) is a shift from 
$2 million to $5–6 million per well in the Woodford Shale of Southeast 
Oklahoma.49 
A concern about the data presented in Figure 5 is the timing of 
the end of the series. Factor prices respond to demand, but it takes 
time to adjust capital levels and prices might therefore be sticky. For 
example, replacing the rig inventory to accommodate larger rigs 
 
47.  The cost in dollars per foot of all wells drilled has increased as follows: 
$187.46/foot in 2002, $203.25/foot in 2003, $267.28/foot in 2004, 
$271.16/foot in 2005, $324.00/foot in 2006, and $574.46/foot in 2007. 
Costs of Crude Oil and Natural Gas Wells Drilled, U.S. Energy Info. 
Admin. (Sept. 7, 2012), http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/xls/PET_CRD 
_WELLCOST_S1_A.xls. The cost per foot for only natural gas wells 
has increased as follows: $175.78/foot in 2002, $189.95/foot in 2003, 
$284.78/foot in 2004, $280.03/foot in 2005, $348.36/foot in 2006, and 
$604.06/foot in 2007. Id.  
48. Id. 
49. Michael Godec et al., Economics of Unconventional Gas 6 (Oil & Gas 
J., Unconventional Gas Article No. 5, 2007). 
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capable of handling deep horizontal wells takes time, and in the short 
run available rigs might command a premium. If 2007 was the peak of 
the boom, then, over time, costs might have subsided, reflecting a 
temporary shortage of capital rather than a long-term change in cost 
due to different technology. Unofficial data in the years since 2007 
confirm the spike in drilling costs, but the costs have not returned to 
levels observed in the 1970s and 1980s.50  
Well servicing is a concentrated industry, which raises the 
possibility of market power. A few large firms dominate the fracking 
business: Halliburton, Schlumberger, BJ, and Sanjel enjoy prominent 
positions.51 Smaller but growing companies include FTS, Cal Frac, 
Weatherford, Pumpco, and Trican. Other firms are growing regionally 
and may become important players in coming years. Certainly there 
are differentiated products in the provision of fracking services, as 
companies actively advertise the superiority of their own fluids and 
consulting services. Determining market power is a more involved 
process requiring a detailed study of the industry. 
Hydraulic fracturing is one of several services provided by firms 
specializing in “field services.” A wide range of contracts are used to 
compensate these firms. One difficulty in accounting the cost of 
fracturing is that well service contracts are often long term and field-
wide. A single contract is negotiated that covers more than one well 
over time and space. Some of the contracts are share contracts, either 
as overrides or as farm-ins. In such a case the final compensation to 
the service crew is a function of the productivity of the well. This 
provides a strong incentive for the servicer to perform. But contract 
 
50. IPAA reports nominal per foot drilling costs rising to $671.87 in 2009 
before falling to $302.21 in 2010. Industry Statistics, Indep. Petrol. 
Ass’n Am., http://www.ipaa.org/economics-analysis-international/indus 
try-statistics/?c=Chart17 (last visited Apr. 13, 2013). This is still 65 
percent above 1998 levels in real terms. Id. 
51. Halliburton, Schlumberger, and BJ have a 75 percent U.S. market share 
for the high pressure pumps needed for fracking. Rogers, supra note 2, 
at 132. Another indication of market prominence is that these same 
three companies entered into a memorandum of understanding with the 
EPA on December 12, 2003. Memorandum of Agreement between The 
United States Environmental Protection Agency and BJ Services 
Company, Halliburton Energy Services, Inc., and Schlumberger 
Technology Corporation on Elimination of Diesel Fuel in Hydraulic 
Fracturing Fluids Injected into Underground Sources of Drinking Water 
During Hydraulic Fracturing of Coalbed Methane Wells (Dec. 12, 2003), 
available at http://www.epa.gov/ogwdw/uic/pdfs/moa_uic_hyd-fract.pdf. 
The intention was “to eliminate diesel fuel in hydraulic fracturing fluids 
injected into coalbed methane (CBM) production wells in underground 
sources of drinking water (USDWs) and, if necessary, select 
replacements that will not cause hydraulic fracturing fluids to endanger 
USDWs.” Id. § I.A. 
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form is itself a choice, and may bias estimates of the value of fracking 
operations. 
II. Regulatory and Environmental Considerations 
A. Regulation 
Current regulatory debate about hydraulic fracturing has focused 
on the merits of federal versus state regulation. At this point the 
primary authority for regulation of oil and gas development and 
hydraulic fracturing is at the state level.52 Different states have 
adopted different strategies for regulating fracking, based in large part 
on experiences in each state.53 The long experience of Texas in oil and 
gas law and its position as an early hotbed of shale gas development 
make its law and regulation a model for many other states.54 
The prospect of external regulation has helped companies 
recognize that preemptive self-regulation might be a preferable 
outcome.55 A step in this direction is the self-reporting of chemicals 
used during fracking operations in specific areas by service companies 
 
52. “State oil and gas commissions review well permits. This review 
addresses legal and engineering criteria such as well construction and 
spacing.” Timothy Fitzgerald, Hydraulic Fracturing in Context: Key 
Institutional Features of an Evolving Technology, U.S. Ass’n for 
Energy Econ. Dialogue (2011), http://dialogue.usaee.org/index.php 
?option=com_content&view=article&id=142:hydraulic-fracturing-in-context-
key-institutional-features-of-an-evolving-technology&catid=48:volume-19-n 
umber-2&Itemid=557. 
53. Several summaries of state regulations are available. E.g., Kulander, 
supra note 15; Res. for the Future, A Review of Shale Gas Regulation by 
State, Center for Energy Econ. and Pol’y, http://www.rff.org/ 
centers/energy_economics_and_policy/Pages/Shale_Maps.aspx (last 
visited Apr. 16, 2013); see also Groundwater Prot. Council & Interstate 
Oil and Gas Compact Comm’n, Regulations By State, FracFocus 
Chemical Disclosure Registry (2013), http://fracfocus.org/regu 
lations-state (providing links to summaries and regulations for each state). 
54. See Dianne Rahm, Regulating Hydraulic Fracturing in the Shale Gas 
Plays: The Case of Texas, 39 Energy Pol’y 2974, 2974 (2011) (“Texas 
is a major player in these [new shale gas drilling] developments and is 
forecast to be the key state contributing to U.S. natural gas supplies in 
the future.”); Travis Zeik, Note, Hydraulic Fracturing Goes to Court: 
How Texas Jurisprudence on Subsurface Trespass Will Influence West 
Virginia Oil and Gas Law, 112 W. Va. L. Rev. 599, 600 (2010) (“West 
Virginia has yet to hear a controversy involving hydraulic fracturing but 
the West Virginia court would most likely follow the lead of the Texas 
court.”). 
55. At least in theory, self-regulation would make sense. Cf. Robert Innes, 
Violator Avoidance Activities and Self-Reporting in Optimal Law 
Enforcement, 17 J.L. Econ. & Org. 239 (2001) (discussing the 
optimum regulatory enforcement level in the law that will encourage 
self-reporting). 
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to FracFocus, an online repository of information about hydraulic 
fracturing jobs.56 This partnership between the Interstate Oil & Gas 
Compact Commission and the Groundwater Protection Council has 
proven to be a comfortable compromise for operators. On one hand 
they would like to release information and reduce public pressure for 
more information about the fracking process. On the other, these 
operators regard their precise recipes for fracturing fluids as 
proprietary information57 and do not want to dissipate the advantage 
of exclusive use of precise combinations of chemicals that increase well 
production.  
B. Environmental Costs 
As hydraulic fracturing has made new resources attractive, many 
communities unfamiliar with extensive oil and gas development have 
been introduced to it. The combination of the appearance of 
development and the usage of a relatively new and rapidly evolving 
technology has stiffened public resistance to change. Concerned 
residents and environmentalists have struggled to understand the 
environmental costs of fracking. In contrast to the aggregate effects 
technology adoption has for energy markets, or the microfractures 
that allow increased productivity, the environmental concerns are on 
a local scale.58 Residents worry about local gas or oil wells 
contaminating water wells, or road damage and traffic caused by 
service crews, or the effect on local air quality of emissions.59 
Regulation of fracking has been widely considered, particularly in 
response to grassroots concerns about environmental quality. But 
definitive evidence of damages due to fracturing and not the result of 
other accidents associated with the development process has been 
difficult to obtain. In part this is because fracking occurs far 
underground, where verification is costly if not impossible. Other 
 
56. Frac Focus Chemical Disclosure Registry, www.fracfocus.org 
(last visited Apr. 16, 2013). 
57. For an interesting discussion on the issue of secrecy and how it relates 
to regulation, see Hannah Wiseman, Trade Secrets, Disclosure, and 
Dissent in a Fracturing Energy Revolution, 111 Colum. L. Rev. 
Sidebar 1 (2011). 
58. Megan Boehnke, Environmental Groups Seek to Block UT’s Fracking 
Proposal, Knoxnews.com (Jan. 29, 2013, 11:00 PM), http://www. 
knoxnews.com/news/2013/jan/29/environmental-groups-seek-to-block-
uts-fracking. 
59. See Lynne Peeples, Fracking Pollution Sickens Pennsylvania Families, 
Environmental Group Says, Huffington Post (Oct. 18, 2012, 6:26 
PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/18/fracking-pollution-
pennsylvania_n_1982320.html (explaining public health concerns with 
fracking in Pennsylvania). 
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accidents, such as surface spills or well blowouts, are much easier to 
observe and address than the direct impacts of fracking itself. 
In the absence of confirmed evidence, anecdotes have filled the 
gap. Changes are certainly observable, even when they are not 
verifiable. This is often due to the absence of adequate baseline data 
to demonstrate damages. Residents of otherwise somnolent places like 
Silt, Colorado,60 and Dimock, Pennsylvania,61 have witnessed changes 
in groundwater quality. Many other locations around the country 
have observed spills, changes, and irregularities.62 Those observations 
have increased calls for regulation, but before effective regulations are 
imposed, some causation needs to be determined.  
Despite studies suggesting a link between toxic groundwater 
contamination and fracturing fluid,63 the demonstrated subsurface 
impact comes in a slightly different form. Instead of finding chemical 
additives, a different study found methane in shallow water wells in 
the vicinity of deep shale gas wells.64 The explicit pathway for this 
 
60. As early as 2001, families in Silt began to report “contamination of their 
drinking water during hydraulic fracturing of four nearby natural gas 
wells owned by Ballard Petroleum.” Later, benzene was confirmed to be 
present in a Silt resident’s water. See Water Contamination, Save 
Colo. from Fracking (May 11, 2010), http://www.savecolorado 
fromfracking.org/harm/waterquality.html.  
61. See Christopher Bateman, A Colossal Fracking Mess, Vanity Fair, 
(June 21, 2010), http://www.vanityfair.com/business/features/2010/06/ 
fracking-in-pennsylvania-201006. 
62. Vaughan & Pursell, supra note 10, at 24–27 (listing a number of 
incidents that have triggered public backlash against fracking). 
63. See, e.g., Tom Myers, Potential Contaminant Pathways from 
Hydraulically Fractured Shale to Aquifers, 50 Ground Water 872 
(2012) (concluding that fracking can contaminate aquifers by releasing 
fluids from the shale and providing methods for testing postfractured 
shale). For a response to Myers, see James E. Saiers & Erica Barth, 
Discussion of Potential Contaminant Pathways from Hydraulically 
Fractured Shale to Aquifers by T. Myers, 50 Ground Water 826 
(2012) (cautioning that Myers used some questionable assumptions and 
asserting that “additional field measurements [are] needed to 
parameterize and calibrate appropriately formulated models”). But see 
Harvey A. Cohen et al., Comment, Discussion of Potential Contaminant 
Pathways from Hydraulically Fractured Shale to Aquifers by T. Myers, 
51 Ground Water (forthcoming 2013) (strongly arguing against 
Myers’ conclusion being flawed).  
64. The initial study was conducted by Stephen Osborn. See Stephen G. 
Osborn et al., Methane Contamination of Drinking Water 
Accompanying Gas-Well Drilling and Hydraulic Fracturing, 108 Proc. 
Nat’l Acad. Sci. 8172 (2011) (observing methane concentrations in 
groundwater near gas wells, calling for more research on methane 
contamination, and suggesting that data collection concerning 
groundwater and methane should be done throughout drilling operations 
to allow for further conclusions). Nathaniel Warner conducted a follow-
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contamination is unknown, though poor well cementing practices are 
suspected. Identifying the causal pathway is a challenge, but the 
discovery itself poses a different problem for environmentalists 
concerned with contamination. Certainly water users do not want 
methane in their water—at the least it is an inconvenience, at worst a 
safety hazard (though health concerns are not especially strong). 
What is more problematic is that some water wells have naturally 
occurring methane. Without evidence about different damages from 
thermogenic and biogenic methane in drinking water, the appearance 
of deep methane in drinking water does not in itself seem to present a 
novel damage. The more salient concern is that if methane appears 
from an unknown source, perhaps other toxic substances are also 
finding their way into drinking water supplies.  
C. Pavillion, Wyoming 
Pavillion, Wyoming, is an unlikely setting for the front line of the 
dispute over hydraulic fracturing. It is a quiet place well off the 
beaten path—there are fewer than 250 residents of the town in a high, 
arid basin.65 The broader area has had some oil and gas development 
for decades; the earliest wells were drilled in the 1960s.66 There are 
two reasons why Pavillion is an appropriate location to test for 
 
up study that may have provided support for concerns that both 
methane and fracking fluid could travel into groundwater as a result of 
fracking. See Nathaniel R. Warner et al., Geochemical Evidence for 
Possible Natural Migration of Marcellus Formation Brine to Shallow 
Aquifers in Pennsylvania, 109 Proc. Nat’l Acad. Sci. 11,961 (2012) 
(finding that some Marcellus Shale formations have preexisting 
connectivity pathways that could be a concern for drinking water 
contamination). Others have doubts about these results. Samuel C. 
Schon, Letter, Hydraulic Fracturing Not Responsible for Methane 
Migration, 108 Proc. Nat’l Acad. Sci. E664 (2011) (claiming that 
Osborn’s finding of methane concentrations near gas wells is due to 
natural processes); Terry Engelder, Letter, Capillary Tension and 
Imbibition Sequester Frack Fluid in Marcellus Gas Shale, 109 Proc. 
Nat’l Acad. Sci. E3625 (2012) (claiming that Warner’s worries about 
fracking fluids travelling through natural pathways are overstated). 
Warner responded to Engelder’s dismissal of his claim. See Nathaniel R. 
Warner et al., Letter, Reply to Engelder: Potential for Fluid Migration 
from the Marcellus Formation Remains Possible, 109 Proc. Nat’l 
Acad. Sci. E3626 (2012) (explaining the findings of their study and 
pointing out flaws in Engelder’s response). 
65. Additional background information on the area and the issues that 
arose can be found in EPA, Investigation of Ground Water 
Contamination near Pavillion, Wyoming Phase V Sampling 
Event, (2012) [hereinafter EPA Summary]. See also Peter Folger et 
al., Cong. Research Serv., R 42327, The EPA Draft Report of 
Groundwater Contamination Near Pavillion, Wyoming 2–5 (2012), 
available at http://wyofile.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/R42327-2.pdf. 
66. Folger et al., supra note 65, at 5. 
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impacts of hydraulic fracturing. First, the state and the immediate 
area are both familiar with oil and gas development from a long 
history. Thus, complaints about damages from fracking are easier to 
distinguish from complaints about development in general. This 
allows isolation of fracking as the proximate cause. Second, a number 
of physical factors outlined below make Pavillion a potentially more 
convincing example of damage from the fracturing process itself. 
Development of new wells preceded complaints by residents of 
degraded well quality.67 Well users reported objectionable taste and 
odor that had not previously been an issue. In 2008 the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) agreed to launch an 
investigation into the reported groundwater contamination after the 
operator conducted two years of tests that did not satisfy the 
residents.68 The area in which the study focused was northeast of the 
town of Pavillion. Two groundwater monitoring wells were drilled to 
test groundwater quality for contamination in June of 2010.69 
Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Commission records indicate 
a total of 125 wells capable of producing in the immediate vicinity of 
the groundwater monitoring wells.70 The mineral ownership is divided 
between tribal, federal, and private ownership. In many cases surface 
owners do not own the minerals under their land. While some of these 
wells were drilled in earlier decades, a large number of the wells were 
drilled in the early 2000s and were completed with fracturing 
treatments to access the tight sands of the Wind River and Fort 
Union formation. All of the active wells are now operated by Encana 
USA, a larger independent company that has aggressively pursued 
unconventional resources in several states.71  
Four factors conspire to make the Pavillion area a likely spot for 
problematic fracturing jobs. First, the bulk of the servicing jobs were 
 
67. See id. at 6. 
68. Id. at 1. 
69. Id. at 4. 
70. The area described is a nine-square mile portion of Township 3N, Range 
2E. The EPA monitoring wells are in sections 10 and 12, respectively. 
This subarea covers most of the 169 production wells cited in the EPA’s 
draft report. EPA, Draft: Investigation of Ground Water 
Contamination near Pavillion, Wyoming 1 (2011) [hereinafter 
EPA Draft Report]. 
71. Encana only drilled the wells that have been constructed since 2004. 
The earlier wells were drilled by Tom Brown, Inc., which Encana 
acquired in 2004. More information on Encana’s history in the field is 
available is available online in a document indicating Encana’s stance on 
the groundwater contamination in Pavillion, Wyoming. See News 
Release, Encana, Why Encana Refutes U.S. EPA Pavillion Groundwater 
Report (Dec. 12, 2011) [hereinafter Encana], http://www.encana.com/ 
news-stories/news-releases/details.html?release=632327. 
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done at a relatively early stage in the technological diffusion.72 
Technical understanding and control is increasing over time, so these 
earlier jobs may have been less precise. The open-hole completions 
used in many of the wells have the lowest degree of control over 
fracture propagation. Second, the fracturing took place at a relatively 
shallow depth—as shallow as 1220 feet below the surface.73 Third, 
groundwater is relatively deep in the area, with water wells extending 
as deep as 800 feet below the surface.74 This leaves a relatively narrow 
vertical horizon separating the bottom of water wells and the 
shallowest fractures; for contrast consider the situation in a typical 
Bakken or Marcellus well where there are thousands of feet of rock 
between the fractured region and groundwater. Fourth, some of the 
gas wells have shallow production casing, which extends only 361 feet 
below the surface in some cases75—a point above the deepest 
groundwater resources. Gas wells with shallow production casing and 
deep groundwater wells are not juxtaposed, but indicate the 
possibility that there are relatively small separations between water 
resources and fractured wells. 
The EPA sampled water in four rounds of testing between March 
2009 and April 2011.76 These tests included two deep monitoring wells 
as well as shallow wells near evaporation pits and existing water wells 
for stock, domestic, and municipal use. A draft report was filed in late 
2011.77 This report indicated that chemicals from fracking fluids were 
found in groundwater. This was the “smoking gun” that 
environmentalists had been waiting for, and several groups wasted no 
time in advertising the draft findings.78 Industry groups, including 
Encana, responded to the alleged link between the contamination and 
the wells fiercely.79 
The ensuing public debate led the United States Geological 
Survey (USGS), working with the Wyoming Department of 
 
72. The drilling of natural gas wells began in 1960. Id. Encana drilled forty-
four new wells between 2004 and 2007, but no wells have been drilled 
since then. Id. 
73. EPA Draft Report, supra note 70, at 2. 
74. Id. 
75. Id. 
76. Id. at 5. 
77. Id. 
78. A summary of all responses is provided by Peter Folger. See Folger et 
al., supra note 65, at 13 nn.49–50, 14 nn.52–53. 
79. See, e.g., Six—Actually, Seven—Questions for EPA on Pavillion, 
Energy in Depth (Feb. 20, 2013, 9:17 AM), http://www.energyin 
depth.org/six-questions-for-epa-on-pavillion (questioning claims of 
contamination); Encana, supra note 71 (same). 
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Environmental Quality, to take additional groundwater samples from 
the EPA’s wells for testing. The USGS report80 was released in 
September of 2012 and discredited the central results regarding 
fracturing fluid contamination in the EPA draft report. The EPA 
backed off some of the conclusions in the draft report81 and delayed 
the comment deadline for the draft report well into 2013.82 The 
experience in Pavillion holds a number of lessons, most importantly 
that the standard of proof is high and that acquiring evidence is 
difficult. 
Conclusion 
In combination with other technologies, hydraulic fracturing has 
helped revolutionize the domestic oil and gas supply outlook in the 
United States. Although a precise accounting of the benefit-cost ratio 
is not feasible, the source of the gains starts with the massive increase 
in reservoir contact that properly designed and implemented fractures 
provide. This in turn increases initial production rates and the 
ultimate recovery of unconventional wells. 
But fracking is still imperfectly understood, which provides both 
opportunities and risks. The opportunities for reducing the variance in 
well performance suggest that the technology can still be fine-tuned 
and productivity gains can be recognized. The environmental risks 
associated with an evolving technology are nontrivial. There has been 
particularly strong grassroots resistance to unconventional oil and gas 
development. That popular discontent has led to calls for increased 
regulatory oversight. Demonstrable and verified links between 
fracking and environmental harm are still lacking. The events in 
Pavillion, Wyoming, indicate that the burden of proof is quite high 
and that definitive evidence of harm will likely be required before 
regulations are created.  
Given the widespread benefits of increased domestic oil and gas 
production and the bundle of technologies that have helped give rise 
to those gains, one might consider why the resistance has coalesced 
around fracking and not some other aspect of development. The most 
convincing answer to that question might be one of political 
convenience. In creating thousands of good-paying jobs, the industry 
does not offer very promising villains in the form of roughnecks and 
 
80. Peter R. Wright et al., U.S. Geological Surv., Groundwater-
Quality and Quality-Control Data for Two Monitoring 
Wells near Pavillion, Wyoming, April and May 2012 (2012). 
81. EPA Summary, supra note 65. 
82. Cassie J. Dallas, EPA Extends Comment Period on Pavillion Groundwater 
Revised Report, N. Am. Shale Blog (Jan. 16, 2013), http://www. 
northamericashaleblog.com/2013/01/16/u-s-epa-issues-updates-on-dimock-
and-pavilion-sampling. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 63·Issue 4·2013 
Frackonomics: Some Economics of Hydraulic Fracturing 
1362 
other blue-collar beneficiaries. But the handful of corporations that 
have been the key to the propagation of hydraulic fracturing are more 
conspicuous and sufficiently anonymous to demonize. Halliburton 
makes a convenient foil.  
A final thought about fracking provides some context for debate. 
A return to an earlier technology that was less productive and 
potentially more environmentally harmful is even less appealing than 
fracking. In 1969, a forty-three kiloton nuclear bomb was detonated 
underground near Rulison, Colorado, in an attempt to free trapped 
natural gas.83 The explosion was not successful in freeing large 
amounts of gas, and what gas was freed was too radioactive to 
market. The area remains off-limits to drilling today due to radio-
activity concerns, despite active drilling in the surrounding area.84 
Another failed experiment in 1973 in nearby Rio Blanco County, 
Colorado,85 led energy firms to experiment again with hydraulic 
fracturing. It is no coincidence that some of the advances made in 
fracking were made in the same area of western Colorado. The 
unconventional resources are there, and the ingenuity of engineers will 
be constantly applied to unlock those valuable resources. Hopefully 
that ingenuity can be married to wisdom of other specialists to 
produce a workable regulatory framework for hydraulic fracturing and 
unconventional oil and gas development more broadly. If not, and 
fracking bans are more widely adopted, consideration may be needed 
for the appropriate regulatory framework for improved nuclear 
fracturing. 
 
83. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Rulison, Colorado, Site: Fact Sheet (2011). 
84. The annulus around the site that is off limits has been reduced. Mark Jaffe, 
Plans Moving Ahead for Drilling near Underground Atomic Blast, Denver 
Post, Dec. 24, 2009, http://www.denverpost.com/ci_14060298?IADID. 
85. See generally Daniel Noonan, Nuclear Bomb Test at Rio Blanco Site, 
CO, Wash. Nuclear Museum & Educ. Center (Feb. 9, 2011), 
http://toxipedia.org/display/wanmec/Nuclear+Bomb+Test+at+Rio+Bla
nco+Site,+CO. 
  
 
   
